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Beyond Coherence
Abstract
Much has happened since the 1960s and 1970s when the idea of self-organization emerged and began to
alter our conceptions of human nature, of social organization, and of a social science that had heretofore
been wedded to linear causal explanations. The experience that systems could organize themselves has
been revolutionary and constitutes a paradigm shift that is still ongoing. In the following, I will (A)
distinguish between indigenously and self-organizing systems, (B) consider autopoiesis as a biological
step towards selfhood, (C) propose a way to distinguish selves and Others, and, based on this, (D)
suggest self-organization to be a social phenomenon. As the notion of self-organization reconceptualizes
social organization and human experience, I will close with (E), suggestions for further work on selforganization.
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Beyond Coherence

Klaus Krippendorff
Annenberg School for Communication
University of Pennsylvania
KKrippendorff@pobox.asc.upenn.edu
Much has happened since the 1960s and 1970s when the idea of self-organization
emerged and began to alter our conceptions of human nature, of social organization, and of a social
science that had heretofore been wedded to linear causal explanations. The experience that systems
could organize themselves has been revolutionary and constitutes a paradigm shift that is still
ongoing. In the following, I will (A) distinguish between indigenously and self-organizing systems,
(B) consider autopoiesis as a biological step towards selfhood, (C) propose a way to distinguish
selves and Others, and, based on this, (D) suggest self-organization to be a social phenomenon. As
the notion of self-organization reconceptualizes social organization and human experience, I will
close with (E), suggestions for further work on self-organization.

Indigenously Organizing versus Self-organizing Systems
Among the phenomena that have been identified as self-organizing (Ashby, 1947; Yovits &
Cameron, 1960; Foerster & Zopf, 1962; Maruyama, 1963; Varela, 1979; Ulrich & Probst 1984;
Prigogine & Stengers, 1984; Eigen, 1988; Haken, 1988, Paslack, 1991) are:


The replicable unfolding of unpredictable forms of organization, whether they are determined
by recursive functions (fractals), the structural properties of a system’s components (crystal
growth), a combination of both (artificial life simulated on a computer), or by certain controlling
parts of a larger system (DNA within living organisms).



Statistically unusual yet sustainable forms of coordination (laser light, tornados).



The spontaneous emergence of organization resulting from interactions among already
organized parts (social organization, beehives, for a rudimentary example, or crowds).
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The rise of latent forms of organization which are unintended and beyond the constituent parts
of a system’s ability to monitor them (institutional hierarchies or organizational cultures like
feudalism or postmodernism).



A decrease of entropy inside a system relative to the entropy in the system’s environment.
I was always uncomfortable speaking of such systems as self-organizing when they do not

speak for themselves, when it is a theory that decides what they are. Let me be clear in how
theorists are implicated in this characterization. First, observers distinguish between the system and
its environment and then proceed to measure or describe what they consider its organization against
a background of their own experiences. Systems so defined, especially their self, cannot possibly
be divorced from the conceptions observers bring to them. Second, the “self” such systems is
recognized mainly in the negative: The “unpredictability” of a system’s organization, the “absence”
of instructions (information about appropriate organizational forms) flowing across the system’s
boundary, the inadequacy of adaptational explanations when self-organizing systems are defined
not to respond to their environment independent of their organization. Apparently, the supposed
“nature” of self-organizing systems results from their observers’ actions and from their inability to
locate a source for their organization outside it. Here, “selves” are observers’ attributes, not shared
by the observed system. I prefer to call such systems indigenously organized.

Autopoiesis, a Biological Condition to Selfhood
A first step towards understanding systems that are capable of defining themselves has been
taken by the biologists Maturana and Varela (1980, 1988). Ontogenetically, they argue, all living
systems operate as recursive networks of interactions that draw and preserve their boundary, thus
distinguishing themselves against the background of what they are not. Living systems organize
themselves under continuous perturbations from their environment, which may well include their
observer. Living systems incorporate matter from their environment, but regard anything that enters
it under the perspective of their own (existing) organization. Thus, living systems are constituted in
a network of interactions that produces all the components necessary to operate that network within
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their boundary. Maturana and Varela call an organization (the particular form of their network of
interactions) that is capable of this self-production autopoieticii. An autopoietic organization is
organizationally closed in the sense that it operates recursively on its organization without knowing
its environment independent from how it operates. Its identity lies in the process of maintaining its
own boundary. Unlike in the self-organization literature, this process is not the result of an
observer’s distinction. However, the autopoiesis of living systems would not be recognizable if the
distinction would fail to acknowledge that boundary.
The theory of autopoiesis is a theory of systems that are free to develop any kind of
organization within their boundaries, provided that this organization preserves its autopoiesis. The
organization of living systems is indigenous except for the need to preserve their autopoiesisiii.
Thus, the organization of living systems is indigenous. Although the preservation of a boundary is
a prerequisite of selfhood, because autopoietic organizations can undergo considerable
organizational drifts, I cannot yet see a self in them. Incidentally, Maturana and Varela do not use
the term self-organization either, although for different reasons.
Maturanaiv acknowledges that observers are autopoietic systems as well and that the
observation of living systems consists in one autopoietic system being coupled to another. As the
two systems interact, each under preservation of their own autopoiesis, coordination inevitably
arises. Language is the most noticeable historical artifact of such coordination and it is indigenous
to that coupling. Language brings forth what it speaks of and thus serves to coordinate that
coordination. However, in claiming such generalizations, Maturana is careful not to contradict his
own autopoiesis by speaking from the illusory position of a God-like observer. Instead, he speaks
of his construction. The popular use of ocular metaphors that depict observers as spectators of
things outside is clearly unworking. But what could another self then be?

Distinguishing Constructed Selves and Others
While autopoietic organizations cannot represent an environment they have no privileged
access to, they can nevertheless organize themselves under conditions of continuous perturbation
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from that environment. Within their organization, living systems can thus be said to construct their
own indigenous realities, realities that are informed by their own history of responding to past
perturbations. In trying to account for Others, it has been tempting to vacillate between two
extreme assumptions, the assumption of a coherent ontology that is same for everyone and the
assumption of us being solipsists. Both assumptions are anti-social in their ultimate effect. When
two observers face each other, they cannot help but acknowledging each other’s presence. How
they see each other and enact their respective conceptions has profound consequences for what
survives. The freedom to construct any reality they please is ultimately constrained by whether they
preserve the autopoiesis of eachv.
This is where von Foerster’s Principle of Relativity applies. The Principle suggests
“reject(ing any) hypothesis when it does not hold for two instances together, although it holds for
each instance separately” (1980b:307). For example, when two solipsists meet, their worldview
falls to pieces as soon as they acknowledge meeting someone like them. And, as soon as they do
construct another organism that is capable of constructing their own reality, neither can claim to
play God and observe the Other directly and from no particular standpoint or perspective. Thus, as
mutual observers, each must grant the other what they claim distinguishes them: the ability of
maintaining a boundary, of organizing themselves indigenously, of constructing complementary
“selves” and “Others,” and of observing the consequences of enacting their constructions. This
precludes the temptations of both, objectivism and solipsism, and brings us on a middle way.
I must point out the obvious, that the Principle of Relativity stated in language, a language
that the two observers are presumed to understand (or coordinate their actions with). Von Foerster
(1980b:307) points out that the Principle is not a hypothesis whose truth or falsity is decided by
evidence. Rather, it offers a choice between conceiving themselves at the center of their own
universe (solipsism) or playing God (objectivism), on the one side, and making the relation between
Thou and I the central reference, on the other. This is also the choice of languaging in monologue
and languaging in dialogue. The second alternative leads us to a recursive conception self as
capable of making choices and becoming accountable to Others for all consequences arising out of
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this conception (Shotter, 1984). It acknowledges observers and observed Others as linguistically
capable agents and participants in the phenomena being described. And it invokes a paradigm shift
for social inquiry. It should be pointed out that rejecting this choice is a choice as well, albeit one
that significantly impairs our ability to understand social phenomena.
The complementary construction of self and Others is entirely consistent with what we know
of our human biology, of our autopoiesis. However, it speaks against the belief in a scientific
ontology, the illusion of being able to access an observer-independent objective world, and the
illusion of being able to observe a reality without an observer. Instead, it renders even simple acts
of observation, especially of Others, as social phenomenon. Under these conditions, accounts of
observations then become less a matter of truth or falsity, as von Foerster points out regarding his
Principle, but whether we, as selves and as Others, can live with them. These conclusions underlie
much of social constructivist thinking. The key to enter the world of Others is to go beyond
coherence.

Social Phenomena and the Necessity of Second-order Understanding
Social phenomena, like money, a family, the Internet or a corporation are constituted in the
understanding its human constituents have of it. If enough people question the value of money, it
can no longer serve as such. If the members of a family no longer see themselves as members of
that family, the family has ceased to exist. If nobody knows how Others use the Internet, there can
be no Internet the way we know it now. Corporations reside in networks of commitments that are
continuously enacted within them. Social constructions so conceived are indigenous social forms
and cannot be understood without a conception of how Others are involved.
Participation in social phenomena requires not just an understanding of that phenomenon
(e.g. as a technology, as a means to an end) but also an understanding of other participants’
understanding of that phenomenon. The understanding of Others’ understanding of social
phenomena is an understanding of understanding and radically different from an understanding of
the causal objects of the natural sciences. I have called the understanding of understanding a
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second-order understanding. By contrast, bureaucracies, hierarchical command structures, and user
instructions succeed only when there is no difference between an authority’s understanding and
their subjects’ understanding, when their understanding is the same. Under these extreme
conditions communication reduces to the application of a code, words mean the same as for
everyone, and human agency is reduced to deciding on efficient actions. Whenever this is so, the
assumption that we all live in the same coherent universe may not get us into difficulties and
second-order understanding reduces to a first-order understanding of how deviate from that norm or
are impaired. Indeed, first-order understanding is encouraged wherever control is intended or
hegemony is believed to rule.
Consistency is the criterion of first-order understanding. The natural sciences have taken the
construction of just one uni-verse as their aim and thus specialize in this kind of understanding. For
example, when theories are encountered that contradict with one another or data turn up that fail to
support a given theory, natural scientists are propelled to seek new theories that overcome such
inconsistencies. Triangulation too is a well-known scientific method that eliminates propositions
that do not fit. The natural sciences are dedicated to preserve coherency of their construction of a
uni-verse. Natural science methods cannot but standardize reality for everyone and marginalizes
otherness. Indigenous forms of organization, autopoiesis, the human ability to construct selves and
Others, the dialogical nature of languaging have no place in consistent constructions and are denied
in first-order accounts of nature.
Second-order understanding is, as I have suggested, an understanding of Others’
understanding. It grants Others to have the very abilities we claim for ourselves: to observe, to
construct, to live with Others, and to understand their worlds. The Principle of Relativity would
suggest that, in the social domain, we must not merely respect but celebrate the possibility of
diverse and equally valid reality constructions. Second-order understanding must embrace logics
different from our own in our own and live with inconsistencies across these realities -- as long as
they do not violate the autopoiesis of their constituentsvi. Second-order understanding becomes
manifest in social theories that leave adequate openings for the constituents of the theorized
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phenomena to enter their own theories into them. Social theories need not and, where they do
respect the otherness of Others, cannot be logically coherent.
Logically coherent social theories may well serve purposes of social control – much as
causal theories can be used to construct mechanical devices. Coherent theories of self-organization
fail to acknowledge the autopoiesis of the human constituents of these phenomena and their
attendant freedom to organize themselves indigenously. The celebration of coherency at the
expense of multi-logical constructions of selves and Others therefore entails the danger of
oppression.
Let me amplify the argument against coherence as a criterion for theories in the social
domain, which the title of this article promised. Bohm (1996) borrowed the metaphor of the laser as
“coherent light” from physics to talk about coherence of human action toward common aims and
considers coherence one result of dialogue. I am aware of the dual meaning of the word
“coherence” -- coordination of action on the one side, and the absence of contradictions on the
other. Bohm is never so clear about the difference. I am leery about the entailments of using
physical metaphors in explanations of social phenomena, precisely because it erodes the very
human agency that the idea of autopoiesis and of self-organization seeks to recover from centuries
of oppressive theorizing. If coherence is the aim, oppressive regimes are quick to follow.
Cherishing incoherences would be a far more respectful aim for the participants in social
phenomena as well as for social scientists attempting to account for them. It would honor the
necessarily indigenous nature of human understanding. It would grant selves to emerge in the
making of choices. It would encourage dialogue -- especially in holding individuals to be
accountable to each other for their actions. It would consider interventions in the unfolding
dynamics of social reality part of that reality. It would also see social scientists as necessary
participants in the very social phenomena they try to understand.
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Implications of Self-Organization
If we are willing to consider self-organization as a phenomenon that involves human beings,
who, by choosing to construct a world and live in it, demonstrate to themselves that they have
selves different from that of Others, then we have to learn to live with diverse reality constructions,
with many concurrent and potentially incommensurate logics, not just our own. I am suggesting
that coherent constructions of reality, scientific theories for example, prevent us from engaging in
the kind of dialogue through which we can experience the different worlds of Others. Dialogue is
never complete. In dialogue, participants remain open to redefine themselves in response to each
other. Inter-individual incoherences are the fuel that drives dialogue – not towards coherence, but
towards preserving its indeterminacy from an outside. In dialogue, whether as stakeholders or as
social scientists, we cannot help but being co-organizers of the very system we wish to understand
as self-organizing.
To further theories of self-organization, I am recommending that other theorists do what I
have tried in the forgoing:


To keep indigenous organization separate from self-organization. Indigenous organization can
occur in entirely deterministic systems, self-organization cannot.



To replace theorists’ attribution of abstract selves by a notion of self as capable of distinguishing
itself from other selves. This, I have argued, takes place in language.



To take self-organization as a social process, one that is constituted in the understanding that its
constituents have of it. Understanding different selves is a second-order understanding.



To consider multiple and incommensurable logics to be an essential ingredient of social
realities. Acceptable social theories must then remain open to the theories held by the human
constituents of the theorized phenomena. In the social domain, coherence cannot be an aim.



To admit our accountability -- not just to our scientific peers -- but foremost to those affected by
our hypotheses. This means reentering social theories into the very process they claim to
describe and allowing the constituents of that process to have a voice in what such theories may
set in motion (Krippendorff, 1996; 1998).
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To assure that theories of social phenomena do not violate the autopoiesis of their constituents,
or better still, that they do not usurp the choices their constituents have to continue the process
or leave it. This speaks against deterministic theories of self-organization.
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Endnotes
i

This paper is the abbreviated version of a presentation to a panel on “Using Self-Organizing Systems to Theorize
Human Organization and Experience” at the 1998 ICA Conference in Jerusalem, presented July 22, 1998.
ii
Maturana and Varela (1980) are not concerned with the fact that living systems are at least in part genetically
determined. They are correct in saying that to understand how living organisms reproduce presupposes an
understanding of their ability to live. This ability requires a circular form of organization, one that could be said to
continuously unfold its own history into a future. In that process, it must merely withstand environmental perturbations.
iii
Here, von Foerster’s (1980a) theory of eigen-behavior can explain the emergence of indigenous forms: Within finite
domains, all recursive operations, which are repeatedly applied to its own results, eventually converge to a smaller set of
behaviors, if not to one that is repeated over and over again. This has also been shown by Ashby (1956:73-85). The
behavior that eventually emerges is the sole result of the operation being repeatedly performed. It is indigenous to it,
and called its eigen-behavior (or eigen-value if it is a state). Within a network of interactions, autopoietic systems
converge to eigen-organizations that are the products of these interactions as well as of the history of the perturbations
experienced. Indigenous or eigen-organizations are relatively stable and are responsible for how the system continues
its autopoiesis, including how it interacts with its environment. It is that system’s reality. Von Foerster summarizes
these considerations in a Postulate of Cognitive Homeostasis: “The nervous system is organized (or organizes itself) so
that it computes a stable reality” (1980b:306).
iv
Personal communication.
v
A construction that is unable to preserve the autopoiesis of its beholder – suicide, fatal mistakes, or actions on illusions
with mortal consequences – ceases with their host.
vi
When the autopoiesis of a living system is violated, it ceases to exist as that system. To the extent social constructions
are predicated on the understanding its constituents have of it, the constituents must remain accountable for their actions
to other participants. This presumes a self that only autopoietic systems can construct within their organization.

